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We propose an experimental method to test individuals for prudence (i.e. downside risk aversion) outside
the expected utility framework. Our method relies on a novel representation of compound lotteries which
allows for a systematic parameterization that captures the full generality of prudence. Therefore, we develop
a general technique for lottery calibration in experiments. Since we investigate a very subtle third-order
property we test our method in the laboratory employing a factorial design. We ﬁnd that it yields robust
results and that prudence is observed on the aggregate as well as on the individual level. Further we show
that preferences based on statistical moments, in particular skewness seeking, can at most approximately
explain individuals’ behavior in the experiment.
Key words: Decision making under uncertainty, risk preferences, prudence, downside risk, statistical
moments, laboratory experiment
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1. Introduction
It is often misunderstood that risk aversion only partially captures an individual’s risk attitudes.
Prudence1 is an entirely independent and complementary preference to risk aversion and has far
reaching implications on economic behavior. Since Kimball (1990) coined the term prudence and
showed that it is necessary and suﬃcient for a precautionary savings motive2, the interest in the
1 We refer to prudence as deﬁned in Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) which within the expected utility framework
corresponds to third-degree risk aversion as deﬁned in Ekern (1980).
2 That means, the awareness of uncertainty in future payoﬀs will raise an individual’s optimal saving today.
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concept has increased rapidly.
Meanwhile, prudence has proved to be important in numerous decision contexts, in particular
in the area of insurance and ﬁnance. For example, a prudent (or downside risk averse) portfolio
manager prefers high uncertainty in her return during good times (when returns are high) rather
than in bad times (when returns are low, such as they are during a ﬁnancial crisis). The stylized
example illustrates that prudence, unlike risk aversion, is linked intuitively to the skewness of a
probability distribution and other statistical measures of downside risk such as value-at-risk.3
Another important behavioral implication that is also inﬂuential for health economics has been
found by Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2005). Prudence inﬂuences preventive action undertaken to reduce
the probability of an adverse eﬀect to occur. Likewise, prudence has been shown to be an important
factor in preventive care decisions within a medical decision making context (see Courbage and
Rey 2006).
Until now there is no experimental benchmark method to test individuals for prudence. More-
over, there are only a few empirical studies so far that can be related to prudence (e.g. Mao 1970
and Unser 2000). A ﬁrst laboratory experiment was conducted by Tarazona-Gomez (2003). These
studies test for prudence as deﬁned within the expected utility theory (EUT) only if a Taylor
expansion of the utility function is truncated (at third order) prior to taking expectations.4 This
preference framework, referred to as truncated expected utility in the following, is a special case of
moment preferences where individuals’ decisions between two prospects only depend on the ﬁrst
few statistical moments of these prospects. As in the study of prudence only prospects with equal
mean and variance will be compared, such third-order moment preferences are equivalent to a pref-
erence for or against skewness. That is, in this setting prudence is equivalent to skewness seeking.
3 More precisely, the example links to downside risk aversion as deﬁned in Menezes et al. (1980) which is equivalent
to prudence. A less stylized example would be life-cycle investment behavior (e.g. Gomes and Michaelides 2005).
A recent article that illustrates the importance of prudence for insurance demand in the case of state-dependent
background risk is Fei and Schlesinger (2008).
4 This expectation of the Taylor expansion of a general utility function (evaluated at random wealth) was ﬁrst
presented in Arditti (1967); see also Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) and Scott and Horvath (1980).Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences 3
This, however, is an assumption as rough as setting risk aversion equal to disliking variance. Thus,
as Brockett and Kahane (1992) and Brockett and Garven (1998) show, these studies do not really
test for prudence. Our experiment not only avoids this simpliﬁcation but also evaluates whether it
is empirically justiﬁed. Although moment preferences, in general, are incompatible with EUT they
are widely assumed in economic modeling due to their simplicity and tractability.5 This is also why
this theory is still an active area of research, see for example Eichner (2008). To our knowledge,
the only experiment that aims to test for prudence in a slightly more general manner is the one of
Deck and Schlesinger (2008).6
In this paper we introduce an experimental method to test for prudence which can be applied
in other experiments, together with a suitable test for risk aversion, to obtain a more complete
picture of individuals’ risk attitudes. For this, prudence is deﬁned according to Eeckhoudt and
Schlesinger (2006) as a preference for proper risk apportionment, i.e. prudent individuals prefer to
‘disaggregate the harms’ of a sure loss and a zero-mean risk. This understanding of prudence is
‘model-free’ in the sense that it applies inside and outside the EUT framework.
We test for prudence giving detailed consideration to the theoretical and experimental chal-
lenges. The lotteries employed cover a wide scope of systematically chosen parameter values and
we propose a new representation for compound lotteries that allows for a suﬃciently complex
parameterization. In spite of this necessary complexity the representation is simple enough so that
it is applicable in experiments. Indeed, by testing the method itself by use of a factorial design, we
show that the decision task is robust towards diﬀerent framing.
The experimental data show that prudence can be observed on the aggregate level, i.e. 65%
of subjects’ decisions are prudent. 47% of individuals (34 out of 72) made a signiﬁcant number
of prudent choices and thus are classiﬁed as prudent. Similarly, 8% of subjects are classiﬁed as
imprudent. Highly inﬂuential is the (statistical) structure of the zero-mean risks in the deﬁnition
5 For example, they underly a large number of classical and also modern portfolio choice models such as Kraus and
Litzenberger (1976) or Briec et al. (2007).
6 This experiment will be discussed more thoroughly later.4 Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences
of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger. This is not surprising as the statistical properties of the prudence
lotteries are mainly driven by the zero-mean risk. In particular, its skewness determines whether
the prudent or imprudent lottery choice has a higher kurtosis. This again makes clear that there is
more to prudence than skewness seeking. Indeed, we ﬁnd that prudence and skewness seeking do
not coincide in practice. Thus lotteries used to test for prudence must feature a suﬃcient degree
of complexity such that the broad scope of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger’s deﬁnition of prudence is
respected.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 analyzes the lotteries underlying the experiment, moti-
vates the parameter choices and outlines the novel lottery calibration technique applied in this
paper. In Section 3 the research questions are stated. Section 4 describes the experimental design
and procedure. In Section 5 results from the experiment and the questionnaire are provided and
Section 6 concludes.
2. Prudence Lotteries and Simple Lottery Approximation
In this section we deﬁne the lotteries underlying our experiment and relate them to prudence. The
lotteries of Mao (1970) represent the class of lotteries that can only be interpreted as testing for
skewness seeking and that are statistically similar to the lotteries used in Deck and Schlesinger
(2008). The comparison to the ‘stronger’ lotteries of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) gives insight
on what there (theoretically) is more to prudence than skewness. As both types of lotteries are
presented to subjects in our experiment we will see whether this diﬀerence remains in practice.
We ﬁrst will deﬁne binary lotteries in general and the ones of Mao. Then we will prove some
results on the latter. After that we will give the deﬁnition of prudence in Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger
(2006) and compare their lotteries to the ones of Mao. We close the section by showing how to
calibrate the lotteries of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger and Mao to each other appropriately. For this,
Theorem 1 will be used that shows the existence and uniqueness of a binary lottery with given ﬁrst
three moments. Thus, every random variable with ﬁnite ﬁrst three moments can be approximatedEbert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences 5
up to the third order by a binary lottery. The calibration technique introduced in this work might
ﬁnd application in any other lottery experiments. All proofs are given in Appendix B.
Definition 1. A (simple) binary lottery denoted by L = L(p x1 x0) is deﬁned as the random
variable
L=X ·x1 +(1−X)·x0
where x1 x0 ∈ R, x1 > x0 and X is a Bernoulli-distributed random variable with parameter p ∈
(0 1), called the (up-) probability of the lottery.
For uniqueness of representation we refer to p as the up-probability and the payoﬀ that occurs
with probability p is always higher then the one occurring with 1−p. We also exclude the trivial
cases (x1 =x0) and p∈{0 1} in our deﬁnition of a binary lottery. Expectation, variance, skewness
and (non-excess) kurtosis of a random variable are denoted by E[·], V[·], ν[·] and κ[·], respectively.
In recognition of Mao (1970) we deﬁne the following.
Definition 2. Two binary lotteries LX = LX(pX x1 x0) and LY = LY (pY  y1 y0) constitute a
Mao lottery pair or a Mao pair if pX =1−pY , E[LX]=E[LY ] and V[LX]=V[LY ].
Note that for the Mao lottery pair, if LX has its high payoﬀ associated with the high probability,
then LY has its high outcome associated with the small probability, and vice versa.
The following proposition gives a statistical characterization of the Mao lotteries. The proof is
instructive, i.e. it shows how to design Mao lotteries. We denote the (non-standardized) nth central
moment or nth moment about the mean of a random variable X by  n(X):=E[(X −E[X])n]. The





2 . Note that in this notation
V(X)= 2(X), ν(X)= S
3(X) and κ(X)= S
4(X).7
Proposition 1 (Statistical Characterization of Mao lottery pairs). Consider a pair of








ν(LX)=−ν(LY) and κ(LX)=κ(LY ).
7 The expectation equality of the Mao lotteries is not needed in the proof. Also note that it is not implied by this
Proposition as  
S
1(·) ≡0, i.e. no statement is made about the ﬁrst moment.6 Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences
Definition 3 (Mao preference). An individual that prefers the lottery of a Mao pair with
the positive skewness (denoted by MB) over the one with the negative skewness (denoted by MA)
is said to be Mao preferent or that it has the Mao preference.
Figure 1 provides an illustrative example of a Mao pair.













Note. The lotteries above correspond to the Mao pair in question MAO1 of the experiment. A Mao preferent individual
prefers lottery MB (with a skewness of +1.15) over lottery MA (with a skewness of −1.15).
Intuition on how skewness manifests in binary lotteries is given in the claim and proof of Theo-
rem 1. We now introduce the lotteries of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) that are used for the
deﬁnition of prudence.
Definition 4 (Eeckhoudt-Schlesinger Prudence). Let X be a Bernoulli distributed ran-
dom variable with parameter p =
1
2 and let k > 0. Let ǫ be a non-degenerate random variable
independent of X with E[ǫ]=0. Consider the random variables (lotteries)
A3 =X ·(0)+(1−X)·(−k+ǫ) and B3 =X ·(−k)+(1−X)·ǫ.
These two lotteries as a pair are called (Eeckhoudt-Schlesinger) prudence lottery pair or ES pair.
An individual is called prudent if she or he prefers B3 over A3 for all values of k, for all random
variables ǫ and for all wealth levels x.8
An example of an ES pair is given in Figure 2.
Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) interpret prudence as ‘proper risk apportionment’. In Figure 2
8 In fact, k may also be chosen negative such that −k corresponds to a gain. In this case the prudent choice would
be the lottery A3 and the imprudent choice would be the lottery B3. To avoid confusion here we stay with positive
values of k. In the experiment, however, we test for consistency regarding this variation. Of course, the decisions of
a truly prudent individual should not be aﬀected by it.Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences 7

























Note. The lotteries above correspond to the ES pair in question ES1 of the experiment. In the example ǫ is left-skewed
implying that lottery A3 has a larger kurtosis than lottery B3. The lotteries in Figures 1 and 2 have equal mean and
variance as well as ν(B3)−ν(A3)= ν(MB)−ν(MA).
the prudent option (B3) implies that the additional zero-mean risk ǫ (i.e. the second lottery)
occurs in the good state of the 50/50 gamble (i.e. in the state where no ﬁxed amount is lost),
whereas in the imprudent option A3 the zero-mean risk occurs in the bad state. Intuitively, a
prudent choice implies a ‘disaggregation of harms’. Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) show that
this preference is equivalent to downside risk aversion as deﬁned in Menezes et al. (1980) or to
third-degree risk aversion as deﬁned in Ekern (1980) within the expected utility framework. The
latter also clariﬁes the relation to the prudence measures deﬁned in Kimball (1990) and Crainich
and Eeckhoudt (2008). We state the following fact without proof as it only requires statistical
standard calculations.9
Fact 1 Consider an arbitrary Eeckhoudt-Schlesinger lottery pair in Deﬁnition 4. A3 and B3 have








In particular, the prudent lottery choice has the higher skewness.
From Proposition 1 and Fact 1 we see that both prudence and the Mao preference imply positive
skewness to be beneﬁcial to the individual. Unlike the Mao preference, prudence requires that
9 The statements for the ﬁrst three moments are also given in Crainich and Eeckhoudt (2008).8 Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences
the lottery with the higher skewness is preferred no matter whether it has the smaller or higher
kurtosis. If, however, third-order moment preferences or third-order truncated expected utility is
assumed, prudence and the Mao preference are equivalent. As mentioned earlier the experiment of
Tarazona-Gomez (2003) made use of this assumption.
The zero-mean risks (the ǫ’s) of the lotteries that were employed in the experiment of Deck
and Schlesinger (2008) throughout were binary lotteries with 50/50 probabilities. It is easy to
see from Fact 1 that this constantly implies the same kurtosis of the two prudence lotteries, i.e.
κ(B3) − κ(A3) = 0. Moreover, Roger (2009) shows the signs of all moments of prudence lotteries
with symmetric ǫ’s (in particular binary ǫ’s with 50/50 probabilities) to coincide with those we
derived in Proposition 1 for the Mao lotteries.10 Thus, from a statistical point of view, prudence
lotteries with symmetric zero-mean risks are essentially equivalent to those of Mao and are far oﬀ
from being as general as the lotteries deﬁned in Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006).
It is the aim of this paper to employ the prudence lotteries in their full generality. Of course, in
the experiment one must restrict to a simple subset of parameter choices. However, it should be
suﬃciently general to capture the requirements in Deﬁnition 4 reasonably well. In the experiment
we will ask subjects also to decide between Mao lottery pairs that act as representatives for this
type of skewness preference that is (theoretically) not suﬃcient to imply prudence.
To have the prudence and Mao lotteries in the same parameter range we now carry out how
Mao lottery pairs must be calibrated so that they are close to the prudence pairs.11 We start
with the following theorem stating that a binary lottery with non-trivial variance and otherwise
arbitrary ﬁrst three moments always exists and the moments uniquely determine the lottery. It
implies that every non-degenerate probability distribution with ﬁnite ﬁrst three moments can be
10 Further, the expression for kurtosis we gave in Fact 1 shows that Roger’s result can not be generalized to arbitrary,
i.e. asymmetric, zero-mean risks.
11 This is a general issue in lottery choice experiments and has been shown to be important, for example, in the
context of multiple price list formats to elicit risk preferences (see Harrison and Rutstr¨ om 2008). We will show that
this calibration has an eﬀect on subjects’ decisions in Subsection 5.4.Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences 9
approximated up to the third moment by a binary lottery and this approximating lottery is unique.
Simple lotteries are one of the main tools to examine decisions under uncertainty and for testing
associated theories like expected utility or prospect theory. Therefore, the following theorem might
ﬁnd application in many experiments and, in particular, is useful for calibration issues. The given
equations facilitate to construct exactly the lottery an experimenter is looking for, conveniently.
Theorem 1. For constants E ∈ R, V ∈ R>0 and S ∈ R there exists exactly one binary lottery
LX =LX(p x1 x0) such that E[LX]=E, V[LX]=V and ν[LX]=S. Setting ˜ S :=4+S2 its param-
eters are given by
p=

     




2˜ S if S <0
1














Now we use this Theorem to calibrate the Mao and ES pairs to each other and deﬁne the approx-
imation of an ES pair with a Mao pair. The Mao pair in Figure 1 and the ES pair in Figure 2
exemplify such an approximation. That is, all four lotteries depicted have equal mean and variance
and the diﬀerences in skewness between the ES pair and the Mao pair are also equal.12
Proposition 2 (Approximation of an ES pair with a Mao pair). Consider a prudence
lottery pair (A B) with ﬁnite ﬁrst three moments. For every S > 0 there exists exactly one Mao
lottery pair (MA MB) such that
E[MA]=E[A] and E[MB]=E[B] 
V[MA]=V[A] and V[MB]=V[B] as well as
ν[MA]=−S and ν[MB]=S.
12 The numerical values of the statistical moments for ES pairs and Mao pairs are given in Table 1 and Table A.1 in





the diﬀerence in skewness of the prudence pair equals the diﬀerence in skewness of the Mao pair
and the quadratic error ∆:=(ν[B]−ν[MB])2 +(ν[A]−ν[MA])2 is minimal.
Definition 5. For a given ES pair (A B) the Mao pair (MA MB) that was shown to exist
in Proposition 2 is called the Mao approximation or the approximating Mao pair of the ES pair
(A B).
3. Research questions
The main purpose of our experimental analysis is to ﬁnd a methodology to test for prudence.
Moreover, our experimental methodology facilitates to answer the research questions presented in
this section.
As explained in Section 2, the Mao lotteries are in structure similar to the ones employed in
earlier studies (e.g. Tarazona-Gomez, 2003). In our experimental methodology they serve as a
benchmark to the ES lotteries that helps to investigate the relationship of prudence and skewness
seeking.
Research question 1 What is the relationship between prudence and the Mao preference?
Answering research question 1 is of particular interest for several reasons. If prudence and the Mao
preference are equivalent, the ﬁrst three statistical moments (or expected truncated utility) seem
to characterize prudence suﬃciently well, giving credit to the studies mentioned earlier. Moreover,
this would support the assumption of moment preferences up to order three in general.13 If Mao
preferent individuals do not exhibit prudence, this implies that prudence is a stronger property, in
practice and in theory. Then it is not suﬃcient to ask lotteries based on the ﬁrst three moments to
test for prudence. In particular, as shown in Section 2, then no binary lottery can be suﬃciently
complex to test for prudence.
Note again that Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger’s deﬁnition for prudence (Deﬁnition 4) is very broad
13 Note, for example that most portfolio choice models are built upon the assumption of moment preferences.Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences 11
in scope. Prudence is deﬁned for any random variable ǫ, any outcome k, any wealth level x and,
of course, is robust towards framing of the decision task.14 Concerning the robustness towards
framing, we test whether it makes a diﬀerence if the task is to add the zero-mean risk ǫ or the ﬁxed
amount −k to a state of the 50/50 gamble, given that the other item (−k or ǫ, respectively) is
already present in one state. This relates to the intuition of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger’s deﬁnition
of prudence as ‘proper risk apportionment’. Further, having k positive and negative can also be
interpreted as a framing issue.15 We state the following research questions.
Research question 2 Are individuals’ decisions independent of whether the ﬁxed amount k cor-
responds to a gain or a loss?
Research question 3 Are individuals’ decisions inﬂuenced by the wealth level x?
Research question 4 Are individuals’ decisions inﬂuenced by diﬀerent framing related to the idea
of proper risk apportionment?
Research question 5 Does the choice of the zero-mean random variable ǫ matter for individuals’
decisions?
On the one hand, we estimate the fraction of prudent choices, i.e. we analyze subjects’ decisions
on the aggregate. The factorial design allows us to investigate what kind of questions will be more
likely to be answered prudently. This is linked to the question of what prevents subjects from being
prudent or what might cause rather prudent subjects to deviate from their preference. On the
other hand, we analyze every individual on its own. That is, our experiment allows us to classify
every individual to be imprudent, prudent, or indiﬀerent. The experiment is followed by a survey
which investigates how prudence is related to individuals’ attitudes, e.g. towards risk aversion, loss
aversion and demand on precautionary savings.
14 This is the reason why a ‘binary lottery preference’ can be equivalent to signing the derivatives of the utility
function or to stochastic dominance – looking more closely, the lottery preference is not that simple. In particular,
the fact that the zero-mean risks are arbitrary adds a large amount of stochastic freedom to these lotteries.
15 This will be explained at length in Section 4.12 Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences
4. Experimental design and procedure
The computerized experiment consists of three main stages.16 In total, each subject makes her indi-
vidual choices over 34 lottery pairs. The lottery outcomes are disclosed in Taler, our experimental
currency. One Taler is worth e 0.15 (about $0.20). Decisions are incentivized by a random-choice
payment technique; this means that one out of 34 decisions is randomly drawn to determine solely
a subject’s payoﬀ. The lottery chosen by the individual in the randomly determined decision is
actually played out at the end of the experiment.
In stage ES, we test subjects for prudence. Subjects reveal their preferences over Mao pairs
in stage MAO. In stage RIAV, we determine subjects’ degree of risk aversion employing the well
established method by Holt and Laury (2002). An extensive questionnaire comprising questions on
loss aversion, precautionary savings and demographic attributes succeeds the experiment. We now
describe the experimental stages in more detail.
4.1. Prudence test embedded in a factorial design – Stage ES
In stage ES we test whether individuals are prudent according to Deﬁnition 4. To this end subjects
are asked to make preference choices over the 16 ES pairs ES1 ES2      ES16.
We introduce a new ballot box representation to display the compound lotteries of the ES pairs.
Figure 3 shows, as an example, how question ES1 (that has already been illustrated more formally
in Figure 2) appears on subjects’ decision screens. It must be understood as follows: Option A and
Option B are displayed in the left and right panel of Figure 3, respectively. For both options the
50/50 gamble is depicted as a ballot box that contains two blue balls named “Up” and “Down”.
The displays of both Option A and Option B themselves are spatially separated, each into an
upper panel containing the “Up-ball”, and into a lower panel containing the “Down-ball”. Now
consider Option A. If the draw from the ﬁrst ballot box is “Up”, then a loss of −40 Taler occurs
to the subject and a second lottery (the zero-mean risk ǫ) succeeds. ǫ is also displayed in a ballot
16 For programming the experimental software zTree was used (Fischbacher 2007).Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences 13
Figure 3 Example of lottery display in stage ES (Question ES1)
box format with 10 balls in total. Yellow balls imply a loss (here: −120 Taler colored in red) and
white balls a gain (here: 13 3 Taler colored in green). In situation “Down” no second lottery follows
and no loss occurs. For Option B, if the draw from the ﬁrst ballot box is “Up” no loss occurs
and a second lottery succeeds (the same ǫ depicted in Option A). If the draw is “Down”, a loss of
−40 Taler occurs.17
This ballot box representation interlinks decisions at the computer screen with the real-world
lottery play at the end of the experiment (see Figure A.1 in Appendix A). Further, it is able to
display asymmetric zero-mean risks and all probabilities are naturally visualized.
To facilitate testing for the broad scope of the prudence preference as deﬁned by Eeckhoudt and
Schlesinger, we employ a completely randomized 24 factorial design; that means four factors, each
at two levels.18 The factors relate to Research questions 2 to 5. The factorial setup allows us to ana-
lyze the inﬂuence of each factor and the interactions of factors on subjects’ responses. A response
17 The order of subjects’ decision screens occurred for each subject in a diﬀerent randomized order and also the
position of the prudent option being either left or right on the screen was randomized.
18 For a detailed description of factorial designs see, e.g., Montgomery (2005).14 Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences
can be either “prudent” or “imprudent”. The factors are as follows: sign of k (Factor A), wealth
level x (Factor B), framing of the decision task (Factor C) and composition of ǫ (Factor D).19
Along the illustration in Figure 3 we now explain how the factors of the factorial design trans-
late into subjects’ decision screens. The outcomes of the 50/50 gamble are 0 Taler and −40 Taler,
displayed as a red bill, implying that Factor A is at level k1 = 40.20 Hence, in the example the
imprudent choice is Option A, as the additional zero-mean risk occurs in the bad state. The alter-
native level of Factor A is k2 =−40. Then the ﬁxed amount is a gain which is displayed as a green
bill. With Factor A we essentially test for an experimental framing eﬀect (Research question 2) and
whether individuals really exhibit the intuition of proper risk apportionment. Whenever k equals
40 Taler, then zero is the bad outcome, whereas when k is equal to −40 Taler, 0 Taler is the good
outcome. Whenever a subject consistently prefers the option where ǫ is added to outcome 0 Taler
we could conjecture that this is due to framing concluding that 0 is a so-called focal point.
Factor B tests for a wealth eﬀect according to Research question 3 and has the levels x1 =160 or
x2 =80 (in Taler). Wealth levels may be interpreted as an endowment subjects receive in order to
accommodate possible negative lottery outcomes. The wealth level on subjects’ screen is indicated
in the upper left corner. In Figure 3 it is set to 160 Taler.
In the example, the decision between the imprudent Option A and the prudent Option B is
whether in the up-state or in the down-state a ﬁxed loss of 40 Taler is preferred given that the
additional risk will be in the up-state. That is, the question on the decision screen is “Where do
you prefer to add a ﬁxed amount of −40 Taler? To situation “Up” or “Down” of the ﬁrst random
draw?” At the other level of Factor C subjects are asked to which situation – either 0 or −k – of
the 50/50 gamble to add a random draw (ǫ).21 Thus the two levels of Factor C are “add k” (a sure
reduction or increase in wealth) or “add ǫ” (a zero-mean random variable). Factor C directly relates
to the intuition behind Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger’s prudence deﬁnition of proper risk apportion-
ment. Moreover, Factor C determines whether it is the ﬁxed amounts or the zero-mean risks that
19 Columns 6 to 10 in Table 1 show a complete design layout including the arrangement of factors.
20 Note that by Deﬁnition 4 the ﬁxed amount is −k, i.e. it corresponds to a loss if k > 0 and to a gain if k < 0.
21 A complete description of subjects’ decision task is given in subjects’ instructions in Appendix C.Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences 15
occur in state “Up” of the 50/50 gamble in both options. Note that Factor C is purely checking for
a framing issue as the lotteries across levels of Factor C are statistically identical. The interaction
of Factors A and C leads to even more diﬀerent framing situations.22
With Factor D we test for a moment eﬀect of the fourth order or, equivalently, if prudence
is invariant under variation of the ǫ’s (Research question 5). In the following we show how our
particular choices of the zero-mean risks in the experiment are motivated by the statistical prop-
erties they induce on the prudence lottery pairs. Since the relationship between mean, variance
and skewness of the ES pair is ﬁxed for all parameter choices (compare Fact 1), and since we test
for a third-order property, it is natural to consider how the ES pairs diﬀer in their kurtosis. When
speaking of kurtosis diﬀerence we consider κ(B3)−κ(A3), i.e. if it is negative this means that the
prudent choice has the smaller kurtosis. According to Fact 1 the kurtosis diﬀerence translates one-
to-one into the skewness of the zero-mean risk. The skewness of a binary lottery is one-to-one to
its up-probability.23 In our example, ǫ is left-skewed, ν(ǫ)=−2 97, such that κ(B3)−κ(A3)<0. If
ǫ in the example had the signs of the outcomes switched it would be right-skewed and the prudent
option had the higher kurtosis. As ǫ has mean zero, skewness has the following interpretation. A
left-skewed ǫ yields a small gain with high probability and a large loss with a small probability.
Further, as we display the ǫ as a ballot box containing 10 balls, skewness translates one-to-one to
the amount of draws implying losses or gains, respectively. Indeed, in the example ǫ implies a loss
of 120 Taler with 10% chance and a gain of 13.3 Taler with 90% chance. Thus, Factor D can take
the levels “κ(B3)−κ(A3)>0” and “κ(B3)−κ(A3)<0”. However, any of the mentioned equivalent
interpretations (kurtosis diﬀerence, skewness of the zero-mean risk, composition of the ballot box)
is captured by Factor D. The practical interpretations of kurtosis diﬀerence support our theoretical
argument in Section 2 that restricting to one particular choice of a binary and symmetric ǫ is a
22 This way we test for quite a variety of diﬀerent framing within our ballot box representation of the ES lottery pairs
what might seem confusing. This is just the point as we will show that our procedure to test for prudence is robust
towards this confusion.
23 For this and the following arguments see Theorem 1 and its proof in Appendix B.16 Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences
rather severe limitation for a procedure that aims to test for prudence.
To sum up, by specifying the four factors as above, we systematically account for the whole
Table 1 ES pairs with their underlying factors and their statistical properties
ǫ Factors Statistical properties
ES Treat. E[A3] V(A3) ν(B3) κ(B3)
pair p z1 1−p z0 comb. A B C D = E[B3] = V(B3) −ν(A3) −κ(A3)
ES1 0.90 13.33 0.10 −120.00 abc 40 160 add −k κ(B3)−κ(A3) < 0 −20.00 1,200.00 2.30 −9.48
ES2 0.10 120.00 0.90 −13.33 abcd 40 160 add −k κ(B3)−κ(A3) > 0 −20.00 1,200.00 2.30 9.48
ES3 0.80 12.00 0.20 −48.00 ab 40 160 add ǫ κ(B3)−κ(A3) < 0 −20.00 688.00 1.92 −3.50
ES4 0.20 48.00 0.80 −12.00 abd 40 160 add ǫ κ(B3)−κ(A3) > 0 −20.00 688.00 1.92 3.50
ES5 0.70 12.00 0.30 −28.00 ac 40 80 add −k κ(B3)−κ(A3) < 0 −20.00 568.00 1.48 −1.33
ES6 0.30 28.00 0.70 −12.00 acd 40 80 add −k κ(B3)−κ(A3) > 0 −20.00 568.00 1.48 1.33
ES7 0.60 8.00 0.40 −12.00 a 40 80 add ǫ κ(B3)−κ(A3) < 0 −20.00 448.00 0.60 −0.15
ES8 0.40 12.00 0.60 −8.00 ad 40 80 add ǫ κ(B3)−κ(A3) > 0 −20.00 448.00 0.60 0.15
ES9 0.90 13.33 0.10 −120.00 bcd −40 160 add −k κ(B3)−κ(A3) > 0 20.00 1,200.00 2.30 9.48
ES10 0.10 120.00 0.90 −13.33 bc −40 160 add −k κ(B3)−κ(A3) < 0 20.00 1,200.00 2.30 −9.48
ES11 0.80 12.00 0.20 −48.00 bd −40 160 add ǫ κ(B3)−κ(A3) > 0 20.00 688.00 1.92 3.50
ES12 0.20 48.00 0.80 −12.00 b −40 160 add ǫ κ(B3)−κ(A3) < 0 20.00 688.00 1.92 −3.50
ES13 0.70 12.00 0.30 −28.00 cd −40 80 add −k κ(B3)−κ(A3) > 0 20.00 568.00 1.48 1.33
ES14 0.30 28.00 0.70 −12.00 c −40 80 add −k κ(B3)−κ(A3) < 0 20.00 568.00 1.48 −1.33
ES15 0.60 8.00 0.40 −12.00 d −40 80 add ǫ κ(B3)−κ(A3) > 0 20.00 448.00 0.60 0.15
ES16 0.40 12.00 0.60 −8.00 (1) −40 80 add ǫ κ(B3)−κ(A3) < 0 20.00 448.00 0.60 −0.15
Note. This table describes the prudence lottery pairs ES1 ES2    ES16 in stage ES. ǫ is the zero-mean risk with its up-state z1, its
down-state z0 and the respective probabilities p and 1−p shown in columns 2 to 5. Column 6 (treatment combinations) indicates which
factor(s) is (are) at its high level; (1) denotes that all factors are at their low level. The explicit arrangement of factors A, B, C and D is
given in columns 7 to 10. The remaining columns provide statistical properties of the ES pairs.
complexity of the deﬁnition of prudence as in Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006). Further, we can
test which conditions in the deﬁnition of prudence have a severe impact on individuals’ decisions
such that they must be accounted for when testing for prudence. A complete overview of the 16
ES pairs, their statistical properties and the arrangement of factors is provided in Table 1.
4.2. Stage MAO
In this stage we investigate whether subjects are Mao preferent in order to answer Research ques-
tion 1. Applying Proposition 2, we obtain 8 diﬀerent pairs of Mao lotteries between which subjects
have to state their preference. There are only 8 pairs, as the change in the kurtosis (Factor D)Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences 17
does not aﬀect these lotteries (see Proposition 1). Thus lottery pair MAO1 is the approximation of
both lottery pairs ES1 and ES2, lottery pair MAO2 approximates ES3 and ES4 and so on. As the
Mao lotteries also imply negative outcomes, subjects are endowed with a certain amount of money
equal to the wealth level x in the corresponding ES pairs. The Mao pairs are shown in Table A.1
in Appendix A.24
For the Mao lottery pairs we choose a graphical representation similar to the one proposed by
Camerer (1989). Here, probabilities are depicted on the vertical and outcomes of the lotteries on
the horizontal axis. The outcome-probability area nicely illustrates the weight of an outcome in
a particular lottery and facilitates comparisons across lottery pairs. Possible gains are colored in
green and losses in red. For an example see the screenshot in the instructions in Appendix C.
4.3. Stage RIAV
In stage RIAV we apply the widely prevalent method invented by Holt and Laury (2002) to test for
risk aversion. Here, subjects are asked to make 10 choices – either Option A or Option B – between
paired lotteries. The 10 lottery pairs are displayed in a table visible to the subject all at once. The
underlying logic is as follows: When the probability of the high-payoﬀ outcome increases enough
by walking down the table, a person should cross over to Option B. Option A always comprises the
less risky lottery but is associated with a lower expected value for the last six choices than Option
B. This implies that a risk neutral agent should choose Option A in the ﬁrst four choices and switch
to Option B afterwards. A risk averse individual switches after the fourth choice, whereas a risk
seeking individual switches to Option B before the fourth choice. See Table A.2 in Appendix A for
the complete set of the lottery pairs in stage RIAV.
24 Analogous to stage ES, the order of subjects’ decision screens is randomly permutated in stage MAO and the
position of the Mao preferent option is randomized.18 Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences
4.4. Procedural details
The experiment was conducted at the BonnEconLab. Overall 72 students of the University of
Bonn from various ﬁelds participated in 9 experimental sessions. The stage order was varied across
sessions (see Table 2 for a complete overview). Each session lasted for about 90 minutes. Subjects
earned on average e 18.50 (about $ 24.70).
The procedure of the experiment was as follows: Firstly, experimenters extensively introduced
Table 2 Session overview
Number of
Session Date Stage order subjects
1 2008/12/10 MAO-ES-RIAV 6
2 2008/12/19 MAO-ES-RIAV 6
3 2009/01/16 MAO-ES-RIAV 8
4 2009/01/16 MAO-ES-RIAV 8
5 2009/01/20 ES-MAO-RIAV 10
6 2009/01/20 ES-MAO-RIAV 8
7 2009/02/11 MAO-ES-RIAV 10
8 2009/02/11 ES-MAO-RIAV 8
9 2009/02/11 ES-MAO-RIAV 8
the decision task and the entire procedure of the experiment to subjects. Secondly, before each
experimental stage started, subjects were asked to answer control questions testing their under-
standing of the decision task. In particular, they were familiarized with the illustration of lotteries
and their outcomes as well as probabilities. Only when subjects had answered these questions
correctly they were allowed to proceed to the decision stages of the experiment. Then, thirdly,
subjects made the decisions in the experimental stages. Fourthly, subjects answered questions of
the questionnaire. For answering the questionnaire subjects received e 4.00 in addition to their
earnings from the experiment (comparable to a show-up fee). Finally, each subject’s payoﬀ was
determined by a random-choice payment technique.25 As already mentioned, subjects made a series
of 34 choices, each with substantial monetary consequences, and ﬁnal earnings are based on just
25 See Laury (2005) for an excellent survey on the random-choice payment method.Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences 19
one of these choices selected at random after all have been completed.
The random choice was made by drawing one ball out of a set of balls numbered between 1
and 34 from a ballot box referring to a lottery pair from stage ES, MAO or RIAV. The subject’s
lottery choice in this randomly drawn lottery pair was actually played out. In stages MAO and ES,
the outcome was allocated to the subjects’ wealth level in that decision, i.e. subjects could charge
the coupon they obtained in the beginning. The ES lotteries were played out using ballot boxes
resembling the lotteries displayed on subjects’ decision screens (see the photograph in Figure A.1).
The binary lotteries in stages MAO and RIAV were played out using a ballot box with 100 balls
numbered from 1 to 100. If, e.g., the up-state had a likelihood of 90%, a draw of the balls numbered
1 2     90 implied the corresponding up-payoﬀ.
5. Experimental results
In this section we present the results of the experiment. We ﬁrst describe subjects’ behavior on
the aggregate level in all three experimental stages. Moreover, we report results from the factor
analysis, the test of moment preferences and analysis of behavior at the individual level. Finally,
we provide an analysis of subjects’ individual characteristics elicited by our questionnaire and their
association to decisions in the experiment.
5.1. Preliminary analysis
A brief overview on subjects’ aggregate behavior is provided in this subsection.26 In our experi-
mental data we ﬁnd substantial evidence for prudence. Overall, 65.10% of subjects’ responses are
prudent. The left panel in Figure 4 illustrates the relative frequencies of subjects’ prudent choices.
26 To rule out possible stage order eﬀects we compare responses from sessions with stage order MAO-ES with responses
from sessions with stage order ES-MAO. The null hypothesis that both samples are drawn from the same distribution
cannot be rejected (for ES-responses: p=0 413 and for MAO-responses: p =1 000, two-sided two-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test). Note that, this analysis is mandatory in order to merge samples from sessions with diﬀerent stage
orders for our overall analysis.20 Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences
On average, 10.42 of the choices are prudent with a standard deviation of 3.65. The median (mode)
of prudent choices is 11 (13). Observed behavior in stage ES diﬀers signiﬁcantly from random
behavior (p=0 0000, two-sided one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test).27
In stage MAO, 77.08% of all questions have been answered in a Mao preferent way. The right
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Note. The left panel of the ﬁgure above shows relative frequencies of the number of subjects’ prudent choices. In the right
panel, relative frequencies of the number of subjects’ Mao preferent choices are indicated (N =72).
panel in Figure 4 illustrates the relative frequencies of subjects’ Mao preferent choices. Each subject
has been, on average, Mao preferent in 6.16 out of 8 questions with a standard deviation of 2.01.
The median (mode) of Mao preferent choices is 7 (8). Also this behavior diﬀers signiﬁcantly from
random behavior (p = 0 0000, one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test). We ﬁnd a positive relation
between fractions of Mao preferent choices and fractions of prudent choices per subject (see Fig-
ure 5) and a signiﬁcant positive correlation of ρ = 0 2844 (p = 0 0155, Spearman rank correlation
test).28
In stage RIAV we tested subjects for risk aversion by applying the procedure of Holt and Laury
(2002). 63 subjects switch from choosing Option A to Option B after the fourth pairwise deci-
sion and, thus, are risk averse. 4 subjects are classiﬁed as risk seeking, whereas 5 subjects chose
27 In the following all statistical tests are two-sided if not indicated diﬀerently.
28 A more in-depth analysis of the relation between lotteries in stages MAO and ES is provided in Subsection 5.4.Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences 21
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Note. This scatter plot contrasts the fractions of Mao preferent and prudent choices per subject. The circumference of
circles varies with the number of observations (N =72).
Option A four times and are, thus, classiﬁed as risk neutral.29
5.2. Within subject analysis
This subsection is concerned with Research question 1 and the relationship of prudence and
skewness seeking. We have already shown that there is a positive correlation (which is a symmetric
association measure). We now show that the actual relation is asymmetric. To this end we
categorize subjects’ responses in stages ES and MAO according to the frequency of prudent
and Mao preferent choices, respectively. A subject who answered 12 or more (4 or less) out of
16 questions prudently is categorized as prudent (imprudent). Subjects who answered 5 to 11
questions prudently are classiﬁed as indiﬀerent. Subjects are classiﬁed as Mao preferent (not Mao
preferent) if they have answered 7 or 8 (0 or 1) out of 8 questions in favor of the lottery with
the positive (negative) skewness. When answering 2 to 6 questions in a Mao preferent manner
subjects are allotted to the category indiﬀerent. This categorization relies on the fact that for
h ≥ 12 successes (prudent choices) in N = 16 cases the null hypothesis can be rejected that
29 One subject was excluded due to multiple switching points.22 Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences
there is no diﬀerence between the probability of making a prudent choice and the probability
of making an imprudent choice (p < 0 0768, binomial test). The same holds true for h ≥ 7 Mao
preferent choices out of N = 8 questions (p < 0 0703, binomial test).30 When we say a subject
is prudent this essentially means that she answered signiﬁcantly more questions prudently than
imprudently. Note that prudence is a very strong property in terms of requirements and, thus, it
is not surprising that individuals may behave prudent in certain situations and in others they do
not.
Table 3 Contingency table on categories
Not Mao preferent Indiﬀerent Mao preferent Total
Imprudent 0 3 3 6
Indiﬀerent 2 13 17 32
Prudent 1 10 23 34
Total 3 26 43 72
To answer Research question 1 we set up a contingency table showing absolute frequencies about
subjects’ categories (see Table 3). Let us ﬁrst analyze prudence and the Mao preference separately.
34 (47.22%) of all 72 subjects are prudent whereas only 6 (8.33%) are imprudent. Note again that
this gives a very diﬀerent picture as from looking at the aggregate responses only. The Mao prefer-
ence is more widely observed than prudence as 43 (59.72%) of all subjects exhibit it whereas only
3 (4.17%) do not. This complies with our arguments made in Sections 2 and 3 as it shows that
also empirically the Mao preference is a weaker property than prudence. The diﬀerence in prudent
and Mao preferent observations immediately indicates that indeed Mao lotteries are not suﬃcient
to test for prudence.
The conditional frequency f(Mao preferent|prudent) that a prudent individual exhibits the Mao
30 In this sense Deck and Schlesinger (2008) were not able to classify an individual as prudent with statistical signif-
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preference is 67.65% whereas f(not Mao preferent|prudent) is only 2.94%.31 The chance for a pru-
dent individual to be Mao preferent thus is about 23 times higher than being not Mao preferent.
The analysis of the reverse statement does not provide such a clear-cut picture. The conditional fre-
quency f(prudent|Mao preferent) is given by 53.49% whereas f(imprudent|Mao preferent) equals
6.98%. Thus the chance of being prudent given that an individual is Mao preferent is about 8 times
higher for an individual that is not Mao preferent. This result, however, is not very reliable as there
are only 3 subjects that were not Mao preferent. Still, we see that knowing about an individual’s
preference towards the Mao lotteries gives some information about whether the individual is pru-
dent. The result also hints in the ‘right’ direction as being Mao preferent increases the probability
of being prudent. In summary, we can state the following result.
Result 1 Most prudent individuals exhibit the Mao preference whereas Mao preferent individuals
may not be prudent.
We conclude that the Mao preference (which is equivalent to prudence under third-order prefer-
ences) is not suﬃcient to make conclusions whether an individual is prudent. Thus, there is more
to prudence than to skewness seeking.
5.3. Inﬂuences on prudent behavior – Factor analysis
To investigate what types of ES questions are more likely to be answered prudently we ﬁx a par-
ticular question and analyze the total of 72 individual responses to this question. Table A.3 shows
relative frequencies of prudent choices per question as well as the underlying factor levels for each
question. In general, we ﬁnd that the particular choice of the prudence lottery pair has a strong
impact on subjects’ decisions so that, indeed, the broad scope of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger’s pru-
dence deﬁnition must be taken into account.
In order to determine what particular elements in the deﬁnition of prudence cause these diﬀer-
ences we investigate Factors A, B, C and D according to Research questions 2 to 5. The analysis
31 If we exclude subjects that were indiﬀerent at least at one stage these numbers become 95.6% and 4.2%, respectively.24 Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences
is carried out at an aggregate level. Fixing one factor and analyzing aggregate responses given the
two distinct factor levels reveals the proportions of prudent choices shown in the upper panel of
Table 4.
As formulated in Research question 2 we are interested whether the ﬁxed amount k being a
gain or a loss (Factor A) inﬂuences subjects’ decisions. When k is a loss, 66.32% of responses are
prudent, whereas slightly less responses are prudent (63.89%) when k is a gain. Test statistics in of
a Wilcoxon signed-rank test and a Fisher-Pitman permutation test for paired replicates in Table 4
show that this diﬀerence is insigniﬁcant (p=0 5253 and p=0 5008, respectively).
Result 2 Subjects’ decisions are robust towards diﬀerent outcomes of the 50/50 gamble, i.e.
whether the ﬁxed amount k is a gain or a loss. Implicitly, 0 as a focal point did not inﬂuence
behavior.
Considering Factor B, 64.76% of choices are prudent if the wealth level x is high (x1 =160) and
65.45% of choices are prudent if x is low (x2 = 80) what indicates an insigniﬁcant diﬀerence (see
the test results in Table 4).
Result 3 Subjects’ decisions are robust towards diﬀerent wealth levels.
Research question 4 asks whether a framing of the decision task (Factor C) inﬂuences subjects’
decisions. The level of Factor C inﬂuences prudent choices substantially, as 67.36% of the choices
are prudent if the level is “add ǫ” and 62.85% if the level is “add −k”.32 Test statistics show that
diﬀerences are signiﬁcant below a 10% level.
Result 4 Framing of the decision task weakly inﬂuences subjects’ decisions. At weak signiﬁcance
more subjects answer questions prudently if the zero-mean risk (ǫ) has to be added to the 50/50
gamble compared to the ﬁxed amount (k).
In essence, Result 4 shows that the decision task involving subjects’ conscious consideration
about another risky event (random draw) leads to more prudent choices, whereas when asked
32 Keep in mind that Factor C also determines whether the ﬁxed amounts or the zero-mean risk occur in the same
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to add a ﬁxed amount subjects make slightly more imprudent choices. Table 4 also shows weak
signiﬁcance for Interaction AC. Weakly signiﬁcant more choices are prudent whenever i) the ﬁxed
amount is a loss (k1 = 40) and subjects are asked to “add ǫ” and ii) the ﬁxed amount is a gain
(k2 =−40) and they are asked to “add −k”.
Factor D considered in Research question 5 is most signiﬁcant (see Table 4). At its low level
Table 4 Analysis of prudent choices for diﬀerent levels of factors and interactions of factors
Factor level Relative frequency p-value (Wilcoxon p-value (Fisher-Pitman








A k1 = 40 0.6632 0.5253 0.5008
k2 = −40 0.6389
B x1 = 160 0.6476 0.9863 0.8362
x2 = 80 0.6545
C add −k 0.6285 0.0697 0.0677
add ǫ 0.6736
D κ(B3)−κ(A3) < 0 0.6163 0.0154 0.0121













AB k1 x1 and k2 x2 0.6406 0.5911 0.4409
k1 x2 and k2 x1 0.6615
AC k1, add −k and k2, add ǫ 0.6285 0.0697 0.0690
k1, add ǫ and k2, add −k 0.6736
AD k1 κ(B3) − κ(A3) < 0 and
k2 κ(B3) − κ(A3) > 0
0.6962 0.0098 0.0165
k1 κ(B3) − κ(A3) > 0 and
k2 κ(B3) − κ(A3) < 0
0.6059
BC x1, add −k and x2, add ǫ 0.6580 0.7375 0.6140
x1, add ǫ and x2, add −k 0.6441
BD x1 κ(B3) − κ(A3) < 0 and
x2 κ(B3) − κ(A3) > 0
0.6458 0.6487 0.7098
x1 κ(B3) − κ(A3) > 0 and
x2 κ(B3) − κ(A3) < 0
0.6563
CD add −k, κ(B3) − κ(A3) < 0 and
add ǫ, κ(B3) − κ(A3) > 0
0.6337 0.1443 0.1288
add −k, κ(B3) − κ(A3) > 0 and
add ǫ, κ(B3) − κ(A3) < 0
0.6684
(negative kurtosis diﬀerence), 68.58% of subjects’ choices are prudent. If Factor D is at its high level
(positive kurtosis diﬀerence), 61.63% of choices are prudent. For questions ES9 (largest positive
kurtosis diﬀerence in the experiment) and ES10 (largest negative kurtosis diﬀerence, other factors
like in ES9) 50.00% and 75.00% of answers are prudent, respectively (see Table A.3). Note again
that a negative kurtosis diﬀerence is equivalent to ǫ being left-skewed, i.e. the ballot box displayed
on subjects’ screens contains more white balls (implying a small gain) than yellow balls (implying26 Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences
a high loss).
Result 5 The particular choice of the zero-mean risk ǫ strongly inﬂuences subjects’ decisions.
Signiﬁcantly more subjects decide prudently if the prudent choice has the smaller kurtosis.
Intuitively, Result 5 shows more choices to be prudent whenever the imprudent option exhibits
more probability mass attributed to extreme outcomes compared to the prudent option. Equiv-
alently, more choices are prudent if the zero-mean risk is left-skewed. Another intuition is, if the
zero-mean risk is considered as particularly “bad” when it is left-skewed, there is a higher necessity
to be prudent. Thus, the properties of the zero-mean risk do inﬂuence subjects’ behavior such
that Research question 5 has to be answered in the aﬃrmative. Result 5 is a major ﬁnding of our
experiment. It emphasizes the importance to use “suﬃciently” complex lotteries when testing for
prudence. We constructed such lotteries by controlling for the ﬁrst four moments in Eeckhoudt
and Schlesinger’s deﬁnition of the prudence lotteries. Factor D shows again that there is more to
prudence than to the ‘pure’ third-order concept of skewness seeking.
Further, signiﬁcantly more prudent choices (69.62% compared to 60.59%) occur when i) the ﬁxed
amount is a loss and the prudent choice has the smaller kurtosis or ii) the ﬁxed amount is a gain
and the imprudent choice has the smaller kurtosis. This is proven by the signiﬁcant Interaction
AD (see Table 4).
5.4. Testing for moment preferences
We now perform a test on moment preferences. Remember that Mao pairs are approximations of
ES pairs in the sense of Proposition 2. That is, the ﬁrst three moments of the lotteries in question
MAO1 correspond to the moments of the lotteries in questions ES1 and ES2, and in this sense
lottery pairs MAO2 correspond to lottery pairs ES3 and ES4, and so on. We investigate whether
there is a stronger association between subjects’ decisions over such corresponding lottery pairs
than to those over the other ones. For each ES question – paired with any Mao question – we set
up 8 contingency tables. That equals 128 2×2-contingency tables, in total, among which are 16Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences 27
tables for corresponding Mao and ES pairs.
As a measure of association we use the phi coeﬃcient (rφ).33 Each contingency table comprises
the four categories i) prudent, Mao preferent, ii) prudent, not Mao preferent, iii) imprudent, Mao
preferent and iv) imprudent, not Mao preferent.
The results shown in Table A.4 are that for 7 out of 16 comparisons the degree of association
between the Mao and the corresponding ES pair is stronger compared to the remaining ones. For 4
out of these 7 associations the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant (at a 6% level) as indicated by test results of
a one-sided Fisher-Pitman permutation test (see last column of Table A.4). The probability that
the degree of association of a corresponding lottery pair is largest by coincidence is one out of
eight. For 7 successes out of 16 observations, the null hypothesis that the probability of a success
on a single trial is 1 8 has to be rejected (p=0 0019 two-sided binomial-test).
Result 6 For a signiﬁcant number of ES pairs the number of prudent choices is ‘closest’ to the
number of Mao preferent choices to the corresponding Mao pair. We ﬁnd that the ﬁrst three sta-
tistical moments have some prediction value but at the same time they are far from completely
explaining subjects’ decision behavior.
Recall from Subsection 5.1 that we have already observed a general positive correlation between
prudence and the Mao preference which under third-order moment preferences are equivalent.
Result 6 again could be interpreted in the way that moments do have some ‘approximate’ expla-
nation value. Note also that the weak association between moments and preferences observed here
supports the necessity of appropriate lottery calibration. This way it can be ruled out that measured
eﬀects between experimental stages are only due to diﬀerent parameter ranges (such as diﬀerent
expected wealth levels) among lotteries. Still, the results are in line with the theoretical ﬁndings of
Brockett and Garven (1998) that subjects’ decisions in the experiment can not be explained com-
pletely by the ﬁrst three moments only. In particular, prudence is not well-captured by skewness
seeking.
33 In general, rφ is used as a measure of association or relation between two sets of attributes measured on a nominal
scale, each of which may only take two values. Note that rφ = 1 implies a perfect positive correlation, rφ = 0 no
correlation and rφ =−1 a perfect negative correlation.28 Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences
5.5. Individual characteristics and questionnaire data
In this subsection we report results from the questionnaire and study the association between pru-
dence and risk aversion. The age of the 72 participants is, on average, 24.25 years; the youngest
individual being 19 the oldest 42 years. Among the participants are 41 female and 31 male sub-
jects. To determine who is prudent we use our classiﬁcation mentioned above. Here, 34 subjects
are prudent and 38 subjects are non-prudent being either imprudent (6) or indiﬀerent (32). The
prudent subjects are, on average, slightly younger (23.73 years) than the non-prudent subjects
(24.71 years); see Table 5.
In order to analyze whether prudent individuals tend to make more precautionary savings as sug-
Table 5 Descriptive statistics on questionnaire data
Age PREC1 PREC2 LA (0 1)
Category Mean Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean
Prudent
(N=34)
23.73 2.5739 62.35 60.00 27.53 305.88 300.00 163.19 0.4706
Non-prudent
(N=38)
24.71 3.8267 60.26 60.00 28.43 242.11 300.00 153.57 0.5263
Notes. This table shows descriptive statistics of questionnaire items for prudent and non-prudent individuals. PREC 1 and
PREC 2 are questions on precautionary savings diﬀering in presented scenarios. LA categorizes subjects as either loss averse
(1) or non loss averse (0) according to their answers to questions LA1 and LA2 (see footnote 34).
gested by Kimball (1990) we ask two questions on precautionary savings in our questionnaire. Ques-
tion PREC1 is about retirement pensions. With equal chance the hypothetical situations i) a retire-
ment pension will be paid out and ii) no retirement pension will be paid out occur. It is assumed
that a subject earns e 1,000 a month. Subjects are asked how much (e 0 e 10     e 100) of
their current earnings they are willing to save in a pension plan each month to account for possible
poverty after retirement. The second question on precautionary savings (PREC2) is about a situa-
tion where an employee can account for a shortfall in wage payments. In a hypothetical situation the
employer promises to the employee to double the wage within six months. The chance that the wage
is not paid is 50%. Subjects are asked how much to save monthly (e 0 e 100 e 200     e 600)Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences 29
out of a wage of e 1,000 in order to accommodate the possible shortfall. Descriptive statistics
in Table 5 indicate that in both situations prudent individuals tend to save more on average.
In question PREC1 prudent individuals save insigniﬁcantly more than non-prudent individuals,
namely e 62.35 compared to e 60.26, on average (p=0 6981, Mann-Whitney U-test). In question
PREC2, prudent (non-prudent) individuals save on average e 305.88 (e 242.11). The diﬀerence
for question PREC2 is more substantial, although not signiﬁcant (p=0 1063).
We tested subjects for loss aversion using two questions from Kahneman and Tversky (1979).34
Out of all individuals 63 (87.50%) made the risk averse choice in the gain domain which is similar
to Kahneman and Tversky’s ﬁndings. In the question set in a loss domain 58.83% (41.17%) of
the subjects chose the safer option (risky option), i.e. the eﬀect we observe is less pronounced.
Distinguishing prudent from non-prudent individuals we observe that the former tend to be less
loss averse (see the last column in Table 5). This ﬁnding is in line with the theoretical results of
˚ Agren (2006) and Maier and R¨ uger (2009).35
Theoretically, prudent individuals can be risk averse, risk neutral or risk loving. This is con-
ﬁrmed by our experimental data where a substantial proportion of subjects is risk averse (87.50%).
Among the prudent (non-prudent) subjects are 1 (3) risk neutral, 29 (34) risk averse and 3 (1) risk
loving. In particular, the degree of risk aversion of prudent and non-prudent individuals does not
diﬀer substantially (p=0 8106, Mann-Whitney U-test).
6. Conclusion
In this paper we thoroughly implement the lotteries of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) to test
individuals for prudence and third-order moment preferences in a laboratory setting. The challenge
34 Subjects were asked to answer the following questions: LA1) Option A: with 90% chance one wins e 3,000 vs.
Option B: with 45% chance one wins e 6000; LA2) Option A: with 90% chance one looses e 3,000 vs. Option B:
with 45% chance one looses e 6000. A loss averse individual will be risk averse in the gain domain and risk seeking
in the loss domain.
35 In general, the literature on the relationship between prudence and reference-dependent preferences is scarce. A
major contribution was recently made by Maier and R¨ uger (2009). However, while their deﬁnition of reference-
dependent preferences is rather general, their analysis of prudence is restricted to symmetric zero-mean risks.30 Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences
lies in respecting the generality of the prudence lottery preference while the representation of the
lotteries must be kept simple enough such that the choice task is easily accessible for experimental
subjects.
Concerning the ﬁrst aspect, we construct a set of 16 prudence lotteries that are controlled up
to the fourth statistical moment. We show that this necessarily requires the zero-mean risks of the
prudence lotteries to be asymmetric. This is realized in our method by choosing binary lotteries
with unequal probabilities. Using binary lotteries with asymmetric probabilities and by system-
atically varying all parameters of the prudence lotteries, we really test for prudence and not for
skewness seeking compared to earlier studies related to this issue. We also carry out several tests
whether, empirically, prudence is suﬃciently well captured by skewness seeking and ﬁnd that this is
not the case. First, one obtains quite diﬀerent results from diﬀerent lotteries that are very close up
to the third order. Second, up to the fourth order subjects respond to diﬀerences in the prudence
lotteries. However, in our experiment we also ﬁnd a weak or ‘approximative’ association between
statistical moments of prospects and preferences.
Concerning the second aspect, we propose a new ballot box representation of the compound
prudence lotteries that reﬂects the full generality of prudence. At the same time it is very easy to
understand and translates naturally from subjects’ decision screens to the real world draw of the
lotteries. As lottery experiments in general are highly sensitive with respect to framing we conduct
robustness tests for our method. By means of a factorial design we test whether diﬀerent types of
framing aﬀect subjects’ decision behavior concerning the intuition of proper risk apportionment.
For an interaction factor we observe weak signiﬁcance. In particular, however, a gain-loss framing
factor that induces a focal point is insigniﬁcant.
Implementation of our method in further studies requires asking individuals for 16 decisions, or
less. As wealth and the ﬁxed amount being a gain or a loss do not inﬂuence subjects’ decisions
signiﬁcantly one could dispense with these variations. Hence, the method could be useful in any
experiment (complementary to a test for risk aversion) to obtain a more complete picture of indi-
viduals’ risk attitudes.Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences 31
From the experimental data we observe prudence on the aggregate as well as on the individual
level. 65% of responses are prudent while 47% of individuals answer signiﬁcantly more questions
prudent than imprudent whereas the converse holds only for 8% of the individuals. The aggregate
fractions substantially vary under diﬀerent parameter constellations in the deﬁnition of prudence.
Questionnaire data reveals that prudent individuals tend to exhibit a stronger precautionary sav-
ings motive.
Moreover, this paper contains a calibration theorem for lotteries that allows the researcher to
construct binary lotteries with desired ﬁrst three moments. It is illustrated how this theorem can
be used to construct diﬀerent types of lotteries in the same parameter range and it is particularly
suited to conduct tests of moment preference. We also present a statistical characterization of the
lotteries of Mao (1970).
As the presented method to test for prudence is robust, it seems natural to also test for tem-
perance. Our representation of the prudence lotteries can be adapted naturally to represent the
temperance lotteries.32 Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences
Appendix A: Tables and ﬁgures
Figure A.1 Sample of ballot boxes
Note. This photograph shows an example of the ballot boxes used to determine subjects’ payoﬀs at the end of the
experiment from a decision made in stage ES, e.g., ES1 (compare to screenshot in Figure 3).
Table A.1 Mao pairs and their statistical properties
Option A Option B Statistical properties
E[MA] V(MA) ν(MB)
Mao pair p x1 1−p x0 p y1 1−p y0 =E[MB] = V(MB) = −ν(MA)
MAO1 0.75 0.00 0.25 −80.00 0.75 −40.00 0.25 40.00 −20.00 1200.00 1.15
MAO2 0.72 −3.48 0.28 −61.64 0.72 −36.52 0.28 21.64 −20.00 688.00 0.96
MAO3 0.67 −3.44 0.33 −54.30 0.67 −36.56 0.33 14.30 −20.00 568.00 0.74
MAO4 0.58 −1.81 0.42 −44.62 0.58 −38.19 0.42 4.62 −20.00 448.00 0.30
MAO5 0.75 40.00 0.25 −40.00 0.75 0.00 0.25 80.00 20.00 1200.00 1.15
MAO6 0.72 36.52 0.28 −21.64 0.72 3.48 0.28 61.64 20.00 688.00 0.96
MAO7 0.67 36.56 0.33 −14.30 0.67 3.44 0.33 54.30 20.00 568.00 0.74
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Table A.2 Lottery pairs according to Holt and Laury (2002) in stage RIAV
Option A Option B Statistical properties
p x1 1−p x0 p y1 1−p y0 E[A] E[B] E[A]−E[B] V[A] V[B]
RIAV1 0.1 20 0.9 16 0.1 38.5 0.9 1 16.40 4.75 11.65 1.44 126.56
RIAV2 0.2 20 0.8 16 0.2 38.5 0.8 1 16.80 8.50 8.30 2.56 225.00
RIAV3 0.3 20 0.7 16 0.3 38.5 0.7 1 17.20 12.25 4.95 3.36 295.31
RIAV4 0.4 20 0.6 16 0.4 38.5 0.6 1 17.60 16.00 1.60 3.84 337.50
RIAV5 0.5 20 0.5 16 0.5 38.5 0.5 1 18.00 19.75 −1.75 4.00 351.56
RIAV6 0.6 20 0.4 16 0.6 38.5 0.4 1 18.40 23.50 −5.10 3.84 337.50
RIAV7 0.7 20 0.3 16 0.7 38.5 0.3 1 18.80 27.25 −8.45 3.36 295.31
RIAV8 0.8 20 0.2 16 0.8 38.5 0.2 1 19.20 31.00 −11.80 2.56 225.00
RIAV9 0.9 20 0.1 16 0.9 38.5 0.1 1 19.60 34.75 −15.15 1.44 126.56
RIAV10 1.0 20 0.0 16 1.0 38.5 0.0 1 20.00 38.50 −18.50 0.00 0.00
Table A.3 Frequencies of prudent choices by question in stage ES
Factors
ES pair Abs. freq. Rel. freq. A B C D
ES1 49 0.6806 -40 160 Add −k κ(B3)−κ(A3) < 0
ES2 43 0.5972 -40 160 Add −k κ(B3)−κ(A3) > 0
ES3 44 0.6111 -40 160 Add ǫ κ(B3)−κ(A3) < 0
ES4 51 0.7083 -40 160 Add ǫ κ(B3)−κ(A3) > 0
ES5 43 0.5972 -40 80 Add −k κ(B3)−κ(A3) < 0
ES6 50 0.6944 -40 80 Add −k κ(B3)−κ(A3) > 0
ES7 52 0.7222 -40 80 Add ǫ κ(B3)−κ(A3) < 0
ES8 50 0.6944 -40 80 Add ǫ κ(B3)−κ(A3) > 0
ES9 36 0.5000 40 160 Add −k κ(B3)−κ(A3) > 0
ES10 54 0.7500 40 160 Add −k κ(B3)−κ(A3) < 0
ES11 45 0.6250 40 160 Add ǫ κ(B3)−κ(A3) > 0
ES12 51 0.7083 40 160 Add ǫ κ(B3)−κ(A3) < 0
ES13 37 0.5139 40 80 Add −k κ(B3)−κ(A3) > 0
ES14 50 0.6944 40 80 Add −k κ(B3)−κ(A3) < 0
ES15 43 0.5972 40 80 Add ǫ κ(B3)−κ(A3) > 0
ES16 52 0.7222 40 80 Add ǫ κ(B3)−κ(A3) < 0
Table A.4 Correlation (rφ) between Mao and ES pairs
MAO1 MAO2 MAO3 MAO4 MAO5 MAO6 MAO7 MAO8 p-value
ES1 0.1491 0.0087 0.0016 0.0888 0.0262 0.0940 0.1027 0.0170 0.0078
ES2 0.0028 0.0194 0.0007 0.0032 0.0045 0.0036 0.0032 0.0005 0.7031
ES3 0.2130 -0.0510 0.0400 -0.0041 0.0117 0.2050 0.2273 -0.1544 0.9688
ES4 0.1050 0.0410 0.1480 0.0960 -0.1035 0.1478 -0.1409 0.1011 0.5859
ES5 0.1315 0.0127 0.0974 -0.0174 -0.0029 0.1229 0.0769 0.0223 0.0547
ES6 0.2800 0.1888 0.1312 0.0806 -0.1176 -0.0075 0.1282 0.0133 0.1953
ES7 0.1272 0.0555 0.1654 0.1120 -0.0127 0.1692 0.1663 0.0508 0.3750
ES8 0.0836 0.1888 0.1312 0.0022 -0.1176 -0.0748 0.1282 0.1501 0.9297
ES9 0.1206 0.1491 -0.0702 0.0361 0.0342 0.0000 0.0327 -0.0945 0.3672
ES10 0.0348 0.0861 0.2026 0.0625 0.0987 0.0000 0.1322 0.0910 0.3125
ES11 0.1713 0.0385 0.0544 -0.0653 -0.2561 0.0320 -0.0253 -0.1383 0.1406
ES12 -0.0940 0.0410 0.1480 0.0166 0.1223 -0.0569 0.0030 0.0318 0.9922
ES13 0.2597 0.3107 0.2243 0.2659 0.2537 0.1413 0.3099 0.1112 0.0156
ES14 -0.1127 0.0270 -0.0212 0.0022 0.1050 -0.2094 0.1992 -0.0551 0.0078
ES15 0.1315 0.0887 0.1689 0.0562 0.0668 -0.0035 0.1435 -0.2989 1.0000
ES16 -0.0075 0.1387 0.1654 0.1120 0.1400 0.1000 0.0933 0.0508 0.9766
Note: p-values are shown for a one-sided Fisher-Pitman permutation test for paired replicates.34 Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Let n∈N be arbitrary. It is well known that the  n(·)-operator is homogeneous of
degree n and translation invariant. The assumption pX =1−pY is equivalent to X =1−Y such that  n(X)=
(−1)
n n(Y ) which for n=2 just implies V(X)=V(Y ). Note that we can write LX =X ·x1 +(1−X)·x0 =
(x1−x0)X +x0 and thus V(LX)=(x1−x0)2V(X). Analogously, we have V(LY )=(y1−y0)2V(Y ). Since the
Mao lotteries have equal variance we obtain (x1−x0)2 =(y1−y0)2 and because of the unique representation
of binary lotteries (see Deﬁnition 1) this is equivalent to
x1 −x0 =y1 −y0. (3)






Because of the assumed variance equality the claim for  
S
n(·) follows immediately. ￿
Proof of Theorem 1. After calculating expectation, variance and skewness of a binary lottery as in
Deﬁnition 1 we ﬁnd that LX =LX(p x1 x0) has to suﬃce the following system of equations
E = px1 +(1−p)x0 (4)



















˜ S2 −4˜ S
2˜ S
  (7)
where p1 is the solution associated with the addition. It is easy to see that the expression under the square
root is always positive. If S =0 there is one solution, namely p=
1
2. Otherwise there are two solutions. Both
these solutions are strictly positive since
 
˜ S2 −4˜ S +4−4=
 
(˜ S −2)2 −4)≤ ˜ S −2 and thus
p1 2 ≥p2 ≥
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All solutions are smaller than 1 since
p1 <1⇐⇒
 
˜ S2 −4˜ S < ˜ S
what can be shown to be true for all ˜ S (and thus for all S) by doing the quadratic expansion as in the
previous calculation. Note that equation (6) is a square root equation and thus we have to verify the solutions.
Obviously, if S = 0 then p = 0 5 is the unique solution. Otherwise, from equation (7) it follows that p1 > p2
and p1 +p2 = 1, i.e. p1 > 0 5 and p2 < 0 5. If S < 0 then p2 does not solve equation (6) because 1−2p2 > 0,
but p1 does. Similarly, if S > 0 only p2 solves equation (6). Thus in any case equation (6) has a unique
solution in (0 1) (such that it is a probability) that will be denoted by p in the following.36
The remainder of the proof is straightforward. For any p obtained from equation (6) the system of equations
(4) and (5) can be solved for a unique solution to obtain the expressions stated in the claim from which
ﬁnally also x1 >x0 is evident. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2. By Theorem 1 there exists exactly one binary lottery LX ≡MA with E[MA]=
E[A], V[MA] = V[A] and ν[MA] = −S. By Theorem 1 there also exists exactly one lottery LY ≡ MB whose
expectation and variance equal that of MA and further ν[MB] = +S. From equation (6) one immediately
obtains pX = 1 − pY such that by Deﬁnition 2 (MA MB) constitutes a Mao lottery pair that fulﬁlls the
requested moment conditions.




indeed achieves its maximum at S =
ν[B]−ν[A]
2 . The diﬀerence in skewness of the Mao pair is 2S and as can
be seen from the previous equation this indeed equals the skewness diﬀerence ν[B]−ν[A] of the prudence
pair. ￿
36 We can see now how skewness is reﬂected in a binary lottery. It has zero skewness if and only if both states have
equal probability. Otherwise, it is positively (negatively) skewed if the high payoﬀ is associated with the low (high)
probability.36 Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences
Appendix C: Instructions
[translated from German for session order MAO-ES-RIAV]
Thank you very much for participating in this decision experiment!
General Information
In the following experiment, you will make a couple of decisions. Following the instructions and depending
on your decisions, you can earn money. It is therefore very important that you read the instructions carefully.
You will make your decisions anonymously on your computer screen in your cubicle. During the experiment
you are not allowed to talk to the other participants. Whenever you have a question, please raise your hand.
The experimenter will answer your question in private in your cubicle. If you disregard these rules you can
be excluded from the experiment. Then you receive no payment.
During the experiment all amounts are stated in Taler, the experimental currency. At the end of the experi-
ment, your achieved earnings will be converted into Euro at an exchange rate of 1 Taler = e 0.15 and paid
to you in cash.
Structure of the Experiment and Your Decisions
In total, you will make 34 decisions throughout the experiment. In each decision you will decide upon which
of two diﬀerent risky events – either Option A or Option B – you prefer.
An example of Option A could be as follows: With 50% chance you will lose 10 Taler or with 50% chance
you will receive 20 Taler. Option B could be: With 20% chance you will receive 0 Taler and with 80% chance
you will receive 10 Taler.
The experiment consists of three stages that will be explained in detail in the following. To determine your
payoﬀ in the experiment, one of your decisions will be randomly chosen. This takes place after you have
completed all your decisions. To this end, the experimenter picks one of 34 balls, marked with numbers
from 1 to 34, out of a ballot box. Each number occurs only once in the ballot box, whereby the draw of a
particular number is equally likely. The outcome of the risky event, that you have opted for, at the randomlyEbert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences 37
chosen decision will afterwards be determined by another random draw. This procedure will be explained
extensively when the stages of the experiment are described.
Keep in mind that only one of your 34 decisions determines your payoﬀ in the experiment.
Therefore each of your single decisions can determine your entire payoﬀ in the experiment.
You make your decisions at the computer screen in the computer lab. For each decision you have a maximum
of 3 minutes. After the experiment, the decision relevant for every participants’s payoﬀ and the outcome of
the risky event will be determined by random draws for each participant in the seminar room. For this the
experimenter will call upon participants one by one.
Note that some risky events comprise negative outcomes. For these questions you therefore receive coupons
indicating an endowment (in Taler). You can charge the coupons when the outcome of the risky event is
determined.
Stage I
In the ﬁrst stage of the experiment you are asked to make eight decisions. On each of the 8 sequent decision
screens you decide which of the two risky events – Option A or Option B – you prefer.
For your decisions you receive an endowment in Taler, because the outcomes of the risky events in this stage
can comprise losses. Accordingly, your payoﬀ in this stage consists of two components:
Endowment and Outcome of the chosen risky event
How is the outcome of the (chosen) risky event determined in Stage I? To this end, there is another ballot
box. This ballot box contains 100 balls marked with numbers from 1 to 100. Each number occurs only once,
thus the draw of a particular number is equally likely.
An example of a decision screen is provided in the following ﬁgure:38 Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences
In Option A you will lose 40 Taler with 75% chance (balls 1 to 75) or with 25% chance you will receive 40
Taler (balls 76 to 100). In Option B you receive 0 Taler with 75% chance (balls 1 to 75) or you will lose
80 Taler with 25% chance (balls 76 to 100). Your endowment is 160 Taler in this example.
Now suppose that this decision was randomly drawn to determine your payoﬀ.
• Suppose you have chosen Option A and assume that a ball is drawn from the ballot box with a number
between 1 and 75. That means, you lose 40 Taler. Your resulting payoﬀ, after allocating the endowment of
160 Taler for this decision to the lottery outcome, is 120 Taler. If a ball with a number between 76 and 100
is drawn, you receive 40 Taler. Under consideration of your endowment your payoﬀ is 200 Taler.
• Suppose you have chosen Option B and assume that a ball is drawn from the ballot box with a number
between 1 and 75. That means, you receive 0 Taler. Your resulting payoﬀ after allocating the endowment of
160 Taler for this decision to the lottery outcome is 160 Taler. If a ball with a number between 76 and 100
is drawn, you lose 80 Taler. Under consideration of your endowment your payoﬀ is 80 Taler.
Stage II
In the second stage of the experiment you make 16 decisions. Again, on each of the 16 sequent decision
screens you decide which of the two risky events – either Option A or Option B – you prefer. In this stage
risky events (may) comprise two random draws.
For each decision one random draw is given. This draw is as follows: With 50% chance the situation “Up”
occurs or with 50% chance the situation “Down” occurs.
For your decisions you receive an endowment in Taler, because the outcomes of the risky events in this stageEbert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences 39
can also comprise losses. Accordingly, your payoﬀ in this stage consists of two components:
Endowment and Outcome of the chosen risky event
How is the outcome of the (chosen) risky event determined in Stage II? For the ﬁrst random draw there are
two balls in a ballot box – one marked with “Up” and the other with “Down”. The draw of a particular ball
is equally likely.
To determine your payoﬀ in this stage two random draws may be necessary. At the second random draw
one ball is drawn from another ballot box with 10 balls. The balls are either yellow or white. Note that
the composition of yellow and white balls may change for diﬀerent decisions in this stage. But within one
decision, i.e. for Option A and Option B, the composition of yellow and white balls remains the same.
Decision type 1
For 8 out of 16 decisions you are asked the following: Given what situation of the ﬁrst random draw – either
“Up” or “Down” – do you prefer a second random draw? An example is provided by the following screen:
In Option A you lose 40 Taler, if situation “Up” occurs in the ﬁrst random draw. If situation “Down” occurs,
you receive 0 Taler and a second random draw succeeds. This second random draw is as follows: With 20%
chance you lose 48 Taler and with 80% chance you receive 12 Taler. In Option B, you lose 40 Taler if in the
ﬁrst random draw the situation “Up” occurs and a second random draw succeeds (The second random draw
is the same as in Option A). When situation “Down” occurs, you receive 0 Taler. For this decision you are
endowed with 160 Taler.
Now suppose the decision from the example above is randomly drawn to determine your payoﬀ.
Suppose you have chosen Option A.40 Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences
• If in the ﬁrst random draw the ball “Up” is drawn, you lose 40 Taler. After allocating your endowment
of 160 Taler for this decision to the lottery outcome, your payoﬀ is 120 Taler.
• If in the ﬁrst random draw the ball “Down” is drawn, you receive 0 Taler and a second random draw
succeeds.
—If in the second random draw a yellow ball is drawn, you lose 48 Taler and your payoﬀ after allocating
your endowment is 112 Taler.
—If in the second random draw a white ball is drawn, you receive 12 Taler and your payoﬀ after
allocating your endowment is 172 Taler.
Suppose you have chosen Option B.
• If in the ﬁrst random draw ball “Up” is drawn, you lose 40 Taler and a second random draw succeeds.
—If in the second random draw a yellow ball is drawn, you lose 48 Taler and your payoﬀ after allocating
your endowment is 72 Taler.
—If in the second random draw a white ball is drawn, you receive 12 Taler and your payoﬀ after
allocating your endowment is 132 Taler.
• If in the ﬁrst random draw “Down” is drawn, you receive 0 Taler. After allocating your endowment of
160 Taler for this decision to the lottery outcome your payoﬀ is 160 Taler.
Decision type 2
For the remaining 8 out of 16 decisions in Stage II you are asked the following: To what situation do you
prefer to add a (ﬁxed) amount – either to situation “Up” where a second random draw succeeds or to
situation “Down” where no second random draw succeeds. Note that the ﬁxed amount can either be positive
or negative. An example is provided by the following screen:Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences 41
In Option A, when situation “Up” occurs in the ﬁrst random draw you receive 0 Taler and a second random
draw succeeds. The second random draw is as follows: With 30% chance you lose 28 Taler and with 70%
chance you receive 12 Taler. When situation “Down” occurs in the ﬁrst random draw, you lose 40 Taler and
no second random draw succeeds. In Option B if situation “Up” occurs in the ﬁrst random draw you lose
40 Taler and a second random draw succeeds (The second random draw is the same as in Option A). When
situation “Down” occurs, you receive 0 Taler and no second random draw succeeds. For this decision you are
endowed with 80 Taler.
Now suppose the decision from the example above is randomly drawn to determine your payoﬀ.
Suppose you have chosen Option A.
• If in the ﬁrst random draw the ball “Up” is drawn, you receive 0 Taler and a second random draw
succeeds.
—If in the second random draw a yellow ball is drawn, you lose 28 Taler and your payoﬀ after allocating
your endowment is 52 Taler.
—If in the second random draw a white ball is drawn, you receive 12 Taler and your payoﬀ after
allocating your endowment is 92 Taler.
• If in the ﬁrst random draw the ball “Down” is drawn, you lose 40 Taler. After allocating your endowment
of 80 Taler for this decision to the lottery outcome your payoﬀ is 40 Taler.
Suppose you have chosen Option B.
• If in the ﬁrst random draw the ball “Up” is drawn, you lose 40 Taler and a second random draw succeeds.
—If in the second random draw a yellow ball is drawn, you lose 28 Taler and your payoﬀ after allocating
your endowment is 12 Taler.
—If in this second a white ball is drawn, you receive 12 Taler and your payoﬀ after allocating your
endowment is 52 Taler.
• If in the ﬁrst random draw the ball “Down” is drawn, you receive 0 Taler. After allocating your endow-
ment of 80 Taler for this decision to the lottery outcome your payoﬀ is 80 Taler.
Stage III
In Stage III you are asked to make 10 decisions on a single decision screen. The risky events between which
you have to decide in this stage are displayed in a table format. In each row of the table you make one
decision. For an illustration see the following ﬁgure:42 Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences
Each risky event comprises two possible outcomes and two corresponding probabilities. You make your
decision at the end of each row by indicating the risky event you prefer (either Option A or Option B).
When making your decisions you do not have to follow a particular order and you can change your decisions
as often as desired within the time permitted.
The outcomes of the risky events in this stage do not comprise losses. Thus, for the decisions in this stage
you do not receive an endowment. Accordingly, your payoﬀ is as follows:
Outcome of the risky event
How is the outcome of the chosen risky event determined in Stage III? To determine the outcome there is a
ballot box with 100 balls marked with numbers from 1 to 100 (analogously to Stage I). Each number occurs
exactly once in the ballot box, i.e. the draw of a particular number is equally likely.
Before the experiment will start now, please note: You are asked comprehension questions before
each stage starts. These questions should familiarize you with the decision task in each stage.
After the experiment, you are asked to answer a questionnaire. For answering the questionnaire you receive
independently from your earnings during the experiment e 4.Ebert and Wiesen: An experimental methodology testing for prudence and third-order preferences 43
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